EUR

In light of "irish bond auctions + #FOMC decision could prove doubleblow for $EURUSD . #QE2 this week unlikely", wonder how it wld derail continued rally of EURUSD?

There is a beautiful reversal, long at 1.2900 could be better

Ashraf,

Given that we are at this 1.30 handle, what do you see happening First on the EURUSD if you had to Choose ONE: 1.40 or 1.20 on the EURUSD.

MONEY TALKS





Trust Greece - To Default

By ALEN MATTICH
A DOW JONES NEWSWIRES COLUMN


In a not very subtle way, the Greek government is blackmailing the euro zone.

To paraphrase, the Greek finance minister said that if the Germans don't continue to bail Greece out, Greece will destroy the single currency.

George Papaconstantinou's actual words to the Financial Times were:

"Restructuring [of Greek debt] is not going to happen.. It would be a fundamental break to the unity of the euro zone."

But the message is the same. That's because, notwithstanding Greek promises to bring the country's finances under control, it is beyond belief that the Greek government can, or is even willing to, enforce the sort of austerity necessary to do so. As long as it cannot or will not, the rest of Europe--which, in effect, means Germany--will have to keep pumping money into the country. Otherwise, Greece will default on its debt. Given that a default of an individual member state is unworkable within the single-currency regime, this means a Greek withdrawal from the euro. And if Greece drops out, the markets are likely to force other "peripheral" European members out.

But how do we know the Greeks can't and won't meet the stringent criteria set out by the International Monetary Fund and the European Union?

Michael Lewis, the author and financial journalist, gives a good account in the latest issue of Vanity Fair. Bear in mind the Greek government, by its own admission, routinely lied about just about every relevant statistic it published, while Transparency International rates Greece, together with Romania, as the most corrupt European Union country, ranking it lower than Ghana, Montenegro, Georgia and Tunisia. So because Greek statistics are so untrustworthy, anecdotal accounts are as good as you're going to get.

Lewis points out that it is reasonable to assume that almost everyone in Greece, including members of Parliament, lies about their tax position. Indeed, not paying taxes is endemic and cultural and unlikely to change soon, not least because the legal process of pursuing tax cheats is so endless, routinely lasting more than a decade, that the authorities don't bother. And because bribery is so much part of the system, on those occasions when tax cheats are caught, they can usually buy their way out of trouble.

For the Greek tax system to be restructured, the country first has to restructure its legal system and somehow end its culture of corruption. No Greek government has a hope in hell of forcing these changes.

Even if you do believe Greek statistics--a very, very foolish proposition for someone investing his own money, though easier to do if you're, say, the European Union and are spending taxpayers' funds--they don't look particularly attractive.

During the first eight months of this year, tax revenues rose 3.3% year-on-year against an official target of 13.7%. True, part of that shortfall will have been caused by a deeper-than-expected economic downturn, triggered by the sovereign-debt crisis. But a third of the Greek economy is underground, unidentified, much less subject to tax. It is a safe bet that the more taxes the government demands, the more the productive part of the economy will hide.

But wait, say supporters, what about the fact that Greece has cut public-sector wages by 15% and operating expenditure by 50%.

First, it would be unrealistic to assume that the Greek government is not massaging these figures to look good. Greeks have always sought the easy way to credibility: trust me, they say. And then they've turned around and lied and, historically, defaulted.

A safe assumption would be that revenues are even lower than reported and that expenditure is even higher. Never mind audits by the European Union and the IMF. It is not in either's interest to force a Greek default. So they will play along with fudges and even outright lies as long as they're not too egregious. But what are acceptable grey areas to them are unlikely to be so for prudent investors.

Second, even with enormous rescue schemes and preferential interest rates, the Greek debt load is proving impossible to contain. The interest bill on its debt during the first eight months of this year was 7% up on the same period last year. Unless the Greek government manages to somehow run a surplus in the not-too-distant future (which is unlikely for the reasons listed above) it will have to continue to be bailed out. The alternative is a debt death spiral and default.

So given the Greek government faces an impossible situation, what incentive does it have to offer much more than cosmetic changes--especially if it believes that the German commitment to the euro is greater than its revulsion at having to keep bailing Greece out? In a word, none.

Clear